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Freeing the Animals

Andrée Collard

These things that, by his science and technology, man has brought about on this earth, on which he first appeared as a feeble animal organism . . . these things do not only sound like a fairy tale, they are an actual fulfillment of every—or almost every—fairy-tale wish.

Sigmund Freud

Science, it would seem, is not sexless; she is a man, a father, and infected too.

Virginia Woolf

I can imagine cages more sour to the spirit than the arbor rising on this island: the cage that studies the experimental subject, the cage that is committed to the pet, the cage that demands survival of the endangered, the cage that rehabilitates the disobedient and the mad, the portable cage of nightmare . . .

Robin Morgan

. . . that doctor don't know what he talking about. He must never seed no mare foal. Who say they don't have no pain? Just 'cause she don't cry? 'Cause she can't say it, they think it ain't there? If they looks in her eyes and see them eyeballs lolling back, see the sorrowful look, they'd know.

Toni Morrison

Excerpted from *Rape of the Wild*, forthcoming in early 1988 from The Women's Press, London

Living Tools

ANIMALS USED IN LABORATORY RESEARCH are living tools. I take the expression "living tool" from Aristotle, who applied it to characterize the slave's situation in the master's world. The slave deserves unequal treatment, he said, "for there is nothing in common to the two parties; the slave is a living tool and the tool a lifeless slave."¹ Naming the slave a tool enables the master to ignore and/or deny the slave's experience of slavery. It enables him to objectify the slave, to be objective about slavery.

In the Aristotelian logic, slaves are naturally inferior because they lack the ability to reason, therefore they are objectified as things subjected to and dependent upon the master's control. Since tools are lifeless, they have no experience other than what the master gives them. Since there is nothing in common between the two parties, the master need not scruple about how he treats the slave. Since slaves are tools, their only function is to extend the master's capabilities and help him do what he cannot do on his own.

With respect to laboratory animals, objectifying them as tools used to further the interest of Science enables the experimenter to remain emotionally detached and to ignore and/or deny the animal's experience. Experimental psychologist Clark L. Hull aptly described this situation when he said that objectivity in animal research consists of regarding "the behaving organism as a completely self-manipulated robot, constructed of materials as unlike ourselves as may be."² As Andrea Dworkin put it, objectivity is what does not happen to you.

From this perspective, the researcher strips the animal of its natural attributes and manipulates it to suit his design. The animal no longer exudes grace, strength, and health. Restricted in body and mind, and drastically altered, it is afflicted with physical and mental diseases. The researcher does not identify with, feel connected to, this animal. Rather he coolly observes and measures its reactions to the substances and conditions to which he subjects it. As the animal is forcibly alienated from its essence and isolated from its kin, so it is separated from the researcher. And, by virtue of the violence the researcher does to animal integrity, he alienates himself from his own nature and from the rest of humanity.

In societies, like Aristotle's and our own, in which the sense of commonality between all living things has been broken and lost, societies fractured and stratified by brute force/power, there is nothing in common between experimenter and animal. The culture teaches us that we are separated from animals by differences in our respective degrees of sentience and intelligence and that since animals are naturally inferior to humans, we

are entitled to patronize and use them as we see fit.

Several decades after Hull gave his directive to would-be animal experimenters, W. Lane-Fetter struck the familiar theme of "animal-as inferior; animal-as-living-tool" when he spelled out in his preface to *Animals for Research* the ethics he hoped would guide the use of animals in laboratories.

An experimental animal—and this applies above all to highly defined strains and types of mice and rats—is part instrument, part reagent, a complicated and incidentally sentient system (emphases mine).²

Just how "incidental" the sentience of animals is to many experimenters is clear when one reviews the work of men such as Robert White of Case Western Reserve University and the Cleveland Metropolitan General Hospital. His achievements include removing the brains of monkeys and dogs and preserving them alive, grafting a brain on the throat of a living dog, and transplanting the heads of rats and monkeys onto the bodies of decapitated rats and monkeys, keeping the heads alive for days.⁴ According to White:

Our main purpose is to offer a living laboratory tool: a monkey "model" in which and by which we can design new operative techniques for the brain.³

Many other people, lay and professional alike, would agree with medical doctor John C. Lilly, the renegade brain researcher who conducted most of his later experiments on dolphins, when he said that "the lowest-grade human moron is above the highest genius in the gorilla or chimpanzee clan."⁶ Lilly's criterion for this quaint gradation of intelligence is the size of the brain.

In certain cases it is necessary to dehumanize the animal and not confuse his purpose with ours. With this point of view I agree as long as the brain is very much smaller than ours. This is the way to strike pay dirt in research with small-brained animals. I spent many years working with cats and monkeys and found this point of view a very good one to take with them. It is most profitable from the standpoint of obtaining rapid results.⁷

Relative brain size also has been used as an argument to justify racism and sexism, both blacks and women having been characterized as having smaller brains than their oppressors. Dehumanization has always "struck pay dirt" for those who choose to use and abuse others.

The rationale for using animals in research has not changed since Claude Bernard (1813–1878), who fathered bio-chemistry on the bodies of large dogs, first formulated it as follows:

[I:] consists in never practicing on a man an experiment which would only cause him harm in any degree, even if the result would greatly interest science, that is to say, [would benefit] the health of other men (my translation).⁸

Behind laboratory walls all over the world, Science (men and women paid for their scientific work) drills, incises, chips, injects, inserts, cauterizes, lesions, sutures, amputates, paralyzes, tests, deprives, rewards, jabs, and shocks legions of living creatures which are more often than not fully conscious, i.e. not under anaesthesia and postoperative sedation. All this is done in "the interest of science" and to "benefit the health of men." The picture varies according to time, place, and the nature of the experiment—sometimes the researcher is more "sensitive" than others, guidelines stricter, sanitary conditions better, and so on. Such measures may affect some aspects of the lives of the animals, but the fact remains that those lives are being violated.

There Is No Pain

"Living tools," "animated instruments" (as Ivan Pavlov named one of his experimental dogs), "Ss" for subjects,⁹ "behaving organisms" and "robots" are words designed to erase the animal's experience. That experience is pain. Researchers go to great lengths to avoid naming it, even when they purposely set out to study pain. To look at pain without naming it is to objectify pain, to transmute pain into a category of knowledge. Thus detached from the subjective experience of the animal, pain can be observed and measured as for instance, so many contractions of guinea pig intestine to a particular stimulus.

⁸By a curious twist of double think, the word "subject" can refer both to the doer of an act (the agent) and the object of the agent's deed. We can say, "The experimenter burned the subject (animals)," or again, "Subject 1 pushed Subject 2 against the cage," with the tacit understanding of who is doing what to whom. Grammatically speaking, we say that "experimenter" is the subject of the first sentence while "subject" is the direct object. In the second sentence, one "subject" is an agent who has acted upon another "subject" who is now the object of the sentence. This ambivalent use of the word suggests an ontological perception of the self as servant, even as victim, as in "God's subjects," "the Queen's/King's subjects," "subject to Fate," "subject to time," "subject to approval," or the passive form of the verb, "to be subjected to." Even the etymology of the word (sub-ject, to throw under) bears this out.

Pain is not a corporeal entity but a perceptual phenomenon that involves a creature's nerve endings and brain. And pain is pain, whether you are a victim of misogyny, racial hatred, or speciesism. In the handful of following examples chosen from among the abundant documentation of animal research, it is quite clear that animal pain and the researcher's drive to power are at the core of experimentation.

Claude Bernard, whom I previously mentioned, was described affirmingly by a contemporary who saw him at work in his "laboratory," a narrow, damp corridor, in which he stood "before his animal table, his tall hat on, his long grey hair dangling down, a muffler about his neck, his fingers in the abdomen of a large dog which was howling mournfully."⁸ The large dog of today, when not anaesthetized, is sometimes "prepared" by laboratory attendants who strap it to a table and remove its vocal cords. No noise. No pain.

Ivan Pavlov and his colleagues spent over a quarter of a century investigating "the activities of the cerebral hemispheres in the dog." They discovered the conditionability of the salivary reflex that made Pavlov's name famous. To read *Conditioned Reflexes*, the compilation of his lectures/demonstrations⁹ delivered in 1924 at the Military Medical Academy in Petrograd, is to experience the nightmare of his dogs, although there is never so much as a hint that the dogs suffered, sometimes atrociously, from Pavlov's progressive sadism. In fact, Pavlov thought it appropriate to reassure his audience that his dogs did not suffer. His experiment might upset "very sensitive people" but this was unjustified, according to him, for he had measured no appreciable changes in the pulse or in the respiration of the animals he subjected to strong stimuli.

It is not uncommon to find experimenters like Pavlov who want to continue to enjoy and to profit from the pain they inflict on animals. Pavlov won the Nobel prize for literally driving the dogs mad and torturing them. *Conditioned Reflexes* cites no less than 236 published researches conducted on "man's best friend" in his laboratory. Of this research, he could only say that he needed more such "studies," for in 1924 "after having acquired some knowledge . . . we feel surrounded, nay crushed, by the mass of details, all calling for elucidation."⁹

Pavlov continued his experimentation advancing in fame and funding while exonerating himself from responsibility for the pain he caused and actually blaming his victims for suffering. For example, one of Pavlov's

⁸It is interesting to note that the harm Bernard inflicted on his animals so horrified his wife that she tried in vain to stop him. In the end, she separated from him and contributed lavishly sums of money to humane societies in an effort to counteract the effects of his work.

⁹It was in one of these lectures that Pavlov spoke of his "remarkable" dog who had ten different conditioned reflexes, earning his nickname of "animated instrument."

dogs had the unfortunate intelligence to understand what was happening to her as well as the will to resist him, his laboratory, apparatus, and procedures. Finally coerced into "acceptance," she was faulted for her pain.

She slinks along behind the experimenter on the way to the experimental rooms, always with her tail between her legs. On meeting members of the staff, some of whom constantly try to make friends with her and pet her she invariably and quickly dodges them, draws back and squats down on the floor. She reacts in the same manner to every slightly quicker movement or slightly louder word of her master, and behaves toward all of us as if we were her most dangerous enemies from whom she constantly and most severely suffered (emphases mine).¹⁰

This passage will sound all too familiar to women who have had the courage to recognize male power as the source of their oppression and to name it. In a system in which violence and hostility toward women are normalized, the woman who resists the violation of herself, who will not be led to submit to male power or patronization—which is a disguised form of violence—is precisely the woman men (and some women) will criticize and devalue the most. She is "angry with men." She is the "man-hater." She is "paranoid." She behaves toward men "as if [they] were her most dangerous enemies from whom she constantly and most severely suffered." Thus, her sanity as well as her veracity are maliciously denied. Like Pavlov's dog, though she speaks out, she is silenced.

Pain perception was the focus of Ronald Melzack and T.H. Scott's classic study on social isolation in dogs. Under the auspices of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Foundations Fund for Research in Psychiatry and the National Research Council of Canada, they restricted Scottish terriers from puppyhood to maturity in individual cages specifically designed to deprive the dogs of sensory and social experiences. They then proceeded to observe and measure the dogs' pathological reaction to their manipulations.

Melzack and Scott used strong electric shock and burning, i.e. they struck matches and attempted to push the flame into the dogs' noses.

To the astonishment of the observers, seven of the ten restricted dogs made no attempt to get away from E [the experimenter] during stimulation. . . ANDE was able to touch [the noses of four dogs] with the flame as often as he wished.¹¹

Not satisfied with burning, they tried jabbing the dogs' skin with needles, still presumably to measure the dogs' pathology.

While the dog was held at the neck, a long dissecting needle was jabbed into the skin at the sides and hind thighs about three to four times.¹²

The dogs raised in non-restricted environments reacted violently to these painful assaults. However,

E was often able to pierce the skin of [the restricted] dog completely so that the needle was lodged in it without eliciting withdrawal or any behavioral indication that pain was being "felt" or responded to other than spasmodic, reflexive jerks. [When released, the dogs stayed close to E] who was then able to repeat the procedure and jab with the needle as often as he wished.¹³

Melzack and Scott have shown through animal torture what historical torturers have known all along: it is possible to traumatize the sense out of living creatures and bring them to the point at which they submit to any atrocity without a whimper while becoming hopelessly dependent upon their torturers. The professed astonishment manifested by the authors of the above cited passages is as gratuitous as it is hypocritical. To devise these methods is madness. To apply them "as often as one wishes" is sadism.*

Nonetheless, the Es spared themselves the realization that their actions are morally repulsive by ignoring the animals' experiences and justifying the omission/distortion as scientific objectivity. Thus Melzack and Scott were able to conclude:

Indeed, to say that these restricted dogs perceived fire and pin-pricks as threatening, or even as painful in any normal sense, would be anthropomorphism rather than inference from observed behavior.¹⁴

In the context of the Es' violence, the word "normal" sounds strangely out of place. As for anthropomorphism, to be accused of it in the slightest degree is to be discredited as a scientist. It means the researcher is not being objective. It may mean that one has slipped into seeing a connection between oneself and the animal subject. It may mean that one is beginning to feel that the "behaving organism" is not constructed of materials so "unlike oneself." To attribute human-like feelings to animals would actually be the beginning of wisdom. As Joan McIntyre has written:

*Women should take especial heed of these facts since we have a history of standing by "our" men/oppressors, whether as prostitutes, battered wives, molested children, incest or rape victims.

We would not be harmed by returning to the roots which once nourished us, which still, unseen, link together all life that lives, and feels, and drinks, and dies, on this, our common planet.¹⁵

To feel this interconnectedness is a scientific taboo—totally ridiculous and unprofessional. To not feel it is to set the stage for sadism.

The acts of animal experimenters like Bernard, Pavlov, Melzack and Scott are not qualitatively different from those which the infamous Marquis de Sade committed on his victims. In her brilliant analysis of pornography, Andrea Dworkin devotes a lengthy essay to de Sade which ought to silence the many who continue to romanticize him as a victim of a puritanical society. She discusses, among other things, Sade's treatment of Rose Keller. In 1768, Sade took Rose Keller to a dark room in his house and locked her in. An hour later, Sade returned and told her to undress. "She refused. He tore her clothes off, threw her face down onto a couch, tied her arms and legs with ropes. He whipped her brutally." He cut her with a knife, rubbed wax and brandy in the wounds as well as "an ointment that he had invented . . . Later Sade alleged that he had paid Keller to be whipped so that he could test his ointment."¹⁶

De Sade rationalized his brutality to women in the same way as experimenters rationalize their cruelty to animals—their acts fall within the cultural norm as defined by men.

I am guilty of nothing more than simple libertinage such as is practiced by all men more or less according to their natural temperaments and tendencies.¹⁷

Dworkin points out that the modern fascination with de Sade resides in the fact that his sexual obsessions are both forbidden and common, and that, like many men, he held the use of women as his absolute right.

Absolute right. Common practice. Blaming the victim. All go hand in hand in justifying the sadism of animal research as well as the sadism of male sexual violence. In a way reminiscent of Pavlov's experiments with "animated instruments" and the subsequent "mass of details" calling for "elucidation"—i.e. more violation of animals in research, rapists justify rape by first perceiving women as "living tools" placed on the earth by their god to gratify the desires of men. They violate her and claim that she "asked for it." Rape trials, during which the victim is forced to re-live the horror of her violation, are the setting for the accumulation of the crushing "mass of details" that call for elucidation, not of the rapist's mentality, but of the

victim's. Blaming the victim ensures the continuation of rape.*

Research such as that of Paul MacLean, who invades the brains of monkeys in pursuit of the seat of human sexual aggression, also ensures the continuation of rape. Finioned in special chairs with electrode grids permanently cemented to their skulls, male monkeys are forced to expose their brains to MacLean's "mille-meter by mille-meter" probing, presumably to elucidate human sexual pathologies. A description of his "findings" and interpretation is worth quoting at some length.

In the dorsal hypothalamus area just above the focal region in the hypothalamus involved in agonistic (fighting) behavior, stimulation elicits full erection usually accompanied by vocalization. Then as the electrode is lowered a little further, signs of angry or fearful behavior begin to appear, as indicated by the quality of vocalization, struggling, biting, and showing of fangs. Afterwards there is characteristically a rebound erection. At the point where the pallidohypothalamic tract loops over the medial aspect of the fornix, only agonistic signs are elicited. Finally as the electrode leaves this focal area stimulation primarily evokes biting or chewing. *The findings would seem to throw some light on the neural basis for aggressive and violent expressions of sexual behavior (emphases mine).*¹¹

It needs to be stressed that "violent sexual behavior" (the subjective term for this is rape) is a problem of human males and certainly not a problem of monkeys. This type of violating research actually serves as a legitimization of rape, first by the violation of the animals who, once trapped in man's laboratory, are entirely at the mercy of their tormentors. In addition, the statement that there is a "neural basis" for rape suggests it is "natural" to man and that there is nothing he can do about it. Attention is redirected from the actual victim of rape to the perpetrators of rape who are cast as hapless victims of their brain circuitry. Furthermore, the suggestion that rape "resides in the brain" leads to the conclusion that attempts to control it would involve invasions of man's brain, while leaving man's misogynistic, power-based culture intact. The invasion of another creature's brain is simply another form of rape.

Another conclusion drawn from this line of research conducted in MacLean's laboratory is that since the head and tail are in physical proximity in the limbic lobe of the brain, oral sexuality is normal. The resulting "enhancement of life" is that now psychiatrists are able to help

*The recent New Bedford, Massachusetts gang rape trial (1984) is a case in point. Rape, as violence against women, was obscured by the crushing mass of details surrounding the victim's alleged participation in the crime against her. Additionally, both court and public attention were further directed away from the rapists' acts by charges of racism brought against the defense.

"relieve guilt feelings in a number of their patients about oral-sexual fantasies and related behaviors."¹²

No animal, large or small, has evolved biologically and psychically to be used as a living tool; to fulfill its destiny in tanks and cages, strapped to experimental chairs and tables; to further man's causes and help him devise ways to cure his mental and physical disorders. Disease and neuroses are human problems. Progress is a human obsession. No animal has played a role in these disorders. No animal is responsible for them. And no amount of animal research will correct them.

Through the Eyes of the Dead

[The scientist] does not wish to see with the lively, wayward eye of the artist, which allows itself to be seduced by what is charming, dramatic or awesome—and to remain there, entranced. It seeks a neutral eye, an impersonal eye . . . in effect, the eyes of the dead wherein reality is reflected without emotional distortion.

Theodore Roszak

The real function of the "animal-as-living-tool" is to provide the researcher with a crutch whereby he can achieve the patriarchal ideal of godliness: power to "create," power to destroy, power to control. Freud saw this relationship between imperfect man and his Science, his vehicle to perfection, when he said:

Today [man] has come very close to the attainment of [his] ideal, he has almost become god himself. . . . Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God. When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent Future ages will bring with them new and probably unimaginably great advances . . . and will increase man's likeness to God still more.¹³

At about the same time as Freud was writing these words in *Civilization and its Discontents*, Spanish histologist Ramon y Cajal expressed the same sentiment about man's Science being the springboard to his greatness.

¹¹It is illuminating to contrast the reality of what MacLean and his colleagues are doing to animals and the reasons they offer for doing it with the image of him presented in *Science Digest* as a thoughtful, sensitive man who is deeply committed to humanitarian concerns. He is quoted as saying: "What is so unusual about human beings is that we've developed this curious concern, not only for ourselves but for other living things For God's sake, what are we doing here? Why is there so much pain and anguish, so much suffering?" (Quoted in Mary Long, "Ritual and Deceit," *Science Digest*, Nov./Dec., 1980, p. 121).

Knowledge of the physiochemical basis of memory, feelings, and reason would make man the true master of creation. His most transcendental accomplishment would be the conquering of his own brain.²¹

In 1970, French biologist Jean Rostand's version of Freud's comment anticipated man's successful efforts to clone life:

By causing life to be born, for a second time, of something other than itself, man will have closed the great, mysterious cycle. A product of life, he will have in turn become a producer of life. He will have come a little closer to the image he furnished of God.²²

To achieve these "godly" goals, scientists must not only be highly technically trained, they must also be emotionally dead, for it is by violating and destroying untold numbers of animals that their so-called "mastery of creation" is wrought. Those scientists who have not lost all of their ability to recognize and respect the life of other sentient creatures are painfully aware of this requirement as they train for their professions. As one physician in my acquaintance put it, her class was taught that "work" on animals was necessary "to teach us desensitization," meaning the detachment necessary "to avoid being overwhelmed by the horror of certain things." Another physician described the animal experiments she had to perform in school as "profligate, non-creative, redundant, time-wasting, life-wasting, dehumanizing." Yet, she did them. She convinced herself that she was silly for feeling upset since no one else seemed to be bothered. Certainly, no one objected.

One such "classical experiment for medical students" is described by Jose Delgado in *Physical Control of the Mind*. The exercise is to

anesthetize a rabbit or other small mammal and to expose its brain in order to stimulate the motor cortex. . . . students are generally impressed by seeing the movements of an animal placed under the command of a human being. The demonstration is far more elegant if the experimental animal is completely awake and equipped with electrodes implanted in the brain.²³

Most impressive about this "demonstration" is that medical students are not horrified on seeing another living creature jump like a puppet on a string at their command.

The desire to conform is especially strong for those at the bottom of the power hierarchy seeking their way to the top. Accordingly, very few students of science have the courage and integrity to question their teachers about the morality of "working on" animals. They know that

being "squeamish," "emotional," "uncooperative," and critical would jeopardize their careers. Yet it is likely that most of these students have already lost the ability to connect in kinship with animals long before entering professional schools. As undergraduates, they refined what they had begun to learn in high school (sometimes even in grade school), that is, to suppress feelings for animals in the laboratory/classroom while "loving" their pet animals at home. When those students finish training in professional school, their ability to compartmentalize is complete. By then, most have learned to look upon animals, and indeed, upon life itself with eyes unclouded by "emotional distortion." with the eyes of the dead.

The question of the oppressor's responsibility and ability to respond has always posed thorny problems in patriarchy, even for those sensitive to the plight of the oppressed. In *Animal Liberation*, Peter Singer maintains that

it should not be assumed that the people named [as abusive to animals in research] are especially evil or cruel people. They are doing what they were trained to do, and what thousands of their colleagues do.²⁴

The people named are not perceived as "especially evil or cruel" people because in societies dominated by the "ideology of cultural sadism" as Kathleen Barry has called it, violent acts are neutralized by virtue of being so common. In the case of animal experimentation, these violent acts are admired (published and replicated) and the actors honored (tenured and funded).

Astonishing cruelty to animals can be legitimated in this way. As Roger Ulrich, who pioneered work on pain-elicited aggression in the rat, said:

I ended up doing things to animals that really made me sick. But I rationalized it. I thought science could do anything, that it could solve our social problems.²⁵

Ulrich stopped doing animal research on the grounds that it is "a repugnant and socially irrelevant practice." Unfortunately for animals, many "thousands of [his] colleagues" have not followed suit.

When animal experimentation is criticized, students, teachers and researchers alike fall back on the two most common justifications: (1) experimentation on live animals is necessary to human welfare and (2) researchers follow strict guidelines that minimize animal suffering. But what is human welfare? Better poisons, better chemicals, better cosmetics, better drugs, better behavior, better brains, better genes? Acceptable levels of unacceptable carcinogenic materials that have invaded everyone's home? Fewer diseases? The dubious benefits of organ transplants? Making

babies in petri dishes? Clones? Human hybrids? Genetically-engineered life-forms? Millions of animals suffer and are sacrificed (killed) yearly for all this "welfare."¹⁶

Despite the impression given to the public that the major purpose of animal experimentation is to find cures for human diseases, only an infinitesimal part of animal research is directed to that end—and much of that could be done by using alternative methods.¹⁷ For example, in his defense of animal experimentation, Gordon Hankinson, Director of the Foster Bio-Medical Research Laboratory at Brandeis University, pointed only to medical progress. He specifically named the polio vaccine as one of the "many health problems" solved through animal research.¹⁸ Yet in reality, the history of the polio vaccine is as follows: the Salk (1953) and Sabine (1956) vaccines are produced from viruses grown in human embryonic tissues. Animals, notably monkeys, were used in the initial research on polio by growing the virus in their nervous systems. This practice was abandoned for lack of results in 1949, when Enders found the alternative that worked better.¹⁹

Most animal experimenters are intellectually dishonest²⁰ about the real goal of their research. As Richard Ryder, who coined the term "speciesism" to denote human prejudice and discrimination in favor of the human species and against members of other species, pointed out, they "are basically conformers who do not question what is expected of them . . . like most men they seek security and success and in order to achieve these ends they know that it pays to toe the line."²¹ So, if the truth be told, the real goal of scientific research is the personal "welfare" of those involved.

As for the argument that researchers follow strict guidelines, the very fact that they are needed indicates that researchers are unable to determine the limits of humane treatment and regulate themselves accordingly.

¹⁶It would take volumes to compile all such experiments conducted in this country alone every year. In 1978, it was estimated that 64 million animals were being used every year in experiments that involve intense suffering. (See Patricia Curtis, "New Debate over Experimenting with Animals," *The New York Times Magazine*, 31 December 1978, p. 23). There is every reason to believe that the count is increasing in 1986. Although mice, rats, cats, and dogs are the animals most frequently used in laboratories—and most frequently objectified in a cursory and trivial sort of way: Mickey Mouse, Felix the Cat, Snoopy, etc.—hardly a species is left that has not shed its blood and/or contributed its pain for what it is like to call "human welfare."

¹⁷For an "even-handed" review and discussion of this issue see D.H. Smyth, *Alternatives to Animal Experiments*. (London: Scolar Press, 1976). Smyth, who regards himself as an "animal lover," is also an experimenter. He is a good example of a scientist who conscientiously practices his god-given right to objectify animals—whether in the laboratory or at home—and to treat them as his desire and the situation dictates, seemingly unaware that all animal experimentation is immoral.

¹⁸For that matter, most people are intellectually dishonest, yet some have the grace not to pose simultaneously as "masters of creation."

Therefore, their professional organizations periodically issue a set of "guidelines" aimed at limiting abuse of animals in housing, surgical and laboratory practices, adherence to which is basically on the "honor system." In all cases, the bottom line is the avoidance of "unnecessary pain." This is a relative expression and unfortunately it is relative to the "needs" of the experimenters, not of the animals. As W. Lane-Petter expressed it in his preface to the book, *Animals for Research*:

To get maximum information out of [the experimental animal], by calibrating and using it to the best advantage, is sensible economy as well as profitable research. An understanding of the nature, capabilities, and limitations of the animal is also likely to lead to its humane use: an end which may be incidental but is always desirable (emphases mine).²²

This language clearly shows the emotional wasteland of the animal experimenter who combines scientific detachment with business interest, his concerns being efficiency and success. When one reaches the point at which one has to specify what humane treatment is, and name it incidental, one has lost all sense of kinship with other creatures.

Our common bond with animals is natural (of nature), normal (of the norm), and healthy (wholesome). This is the way "primitive" communities under goddess worship experienced the communality of all creatures' bond to Mother Earth. In the age of science and technology, the scientist's experiment upon this connection. They splice genes, dissect brains, manipulate behavior to provide us with ways to "promote human welfare" without slackening our commitment to fast-paced, necrophilic modern living.²³

Ultimately, the desecrator of animal life ends up desecrating all life including his own, for he reduces life to discrete mechanisms of measurable quantity. He denies the complex interaction of all life systems, within and without the individual animal, plant, human being. He denies the political, social and economic elements that come into play in that interaction and inform self-perception, perception of others, emotions, motivation and reason. In the end, he has amassed "crushing" amounts of information but has grown not at all in knowledge, or in understanding. For as Joan McIntyre, whose words always reflect a spirit deeply connected to Life, said

²²Thus Paul MacLean assures his readers that satisfying the neocortex consists of gearing up to keep pace with rocket-speed transportation while the limbic system, requiring the pace of the horse and buggy, can be "calmed" living the way Europeans live: "a little smell of horse manure each week" goes a long way in "quieting something deep down inside," and learning the value of "creating pictures and other things." (See Paul D. MacLean, "Man's Reptilian and Limbic Inheritance," in T.J. Boag and D. Campbell, (Eds.), *A True Concept of the Brain and Behavior*, pp. 15-16). I know many Europeans who, like myself, have laughed at the naiveté of this perception, especially with respect to horse manure.

when speaking of the whales slaughtered in the interest of science:

We can pile up the tables and weights and lengths and ages and measures until it reaches the sky, but it won't get us an understanding of the living creature. The way to understand a living creature is to live respectfully in its presence, to approach it with tact, grace and love.¹⁹

.....

Freeing the Animals

Do we fully understand that we aim at nothing less than an entire subversion of the present order of society, a dissolution of the whole existing social compact?

Elizabeth Oakes Smith

Imagine that aliens endowed with a man-like mentality invaded Earth in search of experimental subjects. Suppose they held life in contempt and humans as barely sentient, inferior creatures, excellent specimens in fact, to serve as animated instruments and living tools in their vast and various health projects. They want to help themselves. They want information to feed into their new technologies. They dream of conquering space. They do not question the morality of capturing humans. They do not hesitate to cage and torture us, cement all kinds of hardware into us, wire us to superelectronic machines, reward and punish us to modify our behavior, infest us with diseases unknown to us. We resist. We reason. We bite, punch, kick, scream, pound, scratch, pull and tug to exhaustion. We are restrained in harnesses. We are sedated by force. We are exterminated. We go down in their history books as vicious, stupid, dangerous, uncooperative. We are indeed inferior. They can prove it.

In *Beaver Tears*, Dr. Alice B. Sheldon (alias James Tiptree, Jr.) imagines another version of this scenario. As she begins her story, "he" is watching a nature show on television, one of those savior-conservationist affairs which in this case involves the relocation of beavers. He falls asleep. He wakes up to find himself in the same predicament as the trapped beavers: bruised, separated from his wife and child, and utterly bewildered. He realizes that he and a handful of neighbors have been captured by aliens and are aboard a spaceship bound for an unknown destination. As he recognizes and observes his cagemates, he concludes that the relocation of their future human colony promises no change in the necrophilic values and violent behavior that obtain on planet Earth.²¹

In 1979, at a symposium organized to protest the harassment of feminist professors in American universities, I spoke about the human harassment of animals. After the lecture, a visibly upset woman in the audience rose and demanded that we all march to the research laboratories of Harvard University, where she had previously been employed. We would open the doors to all the cages. We would free the animals. Our example would motivate women all over the world to take all research laboratories by storm, and this would be the end of the animals' concentration/extermination-camp existence everywhere. We all remained in our seats. I drove home feeling like a hypocrite and rationalized our powerlessness.

My fantasies run the same course as those of that admirable woman. I see huge numbers of women overtaking all the laboratories in the world. I see euthanasia for the hopelessly maimed and I see freedom. I see teams upon teams of researchers pacing the empty floors and hearing echos, staring at the blank walls, watching their shattered illusions, and pondering what they have done. I also see each and everyone of us doing what she does best. For some, this best is marching on laboratories. Others will choose the power of the spoken/written word. All will choose to refuse participation in man's brutal treatment of life, in whatever shape it is manifested.

Women can readily identify with the plight of animals, not only because we are so closely connected to nature but also and primarily because we know the many faces of oppression. We recognize them in our guts. We can be moved to outrage without feeling a need to justify our emotions. I took an instant dislike to Peter Singer for insisting so much on being reasonable about his opposition to the abuse of animals, even though *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics For Our Treatment of Animals*^{*} is a courageous book that needed to be written, and even though I agree with his proposition that animal experimentation and intensive farming are "morally unjustifiable" and "morally repugnant." Singer's fear of appearing too "soft," of being called "an animal lover" and appealing to emotions "that cannot be supported by reason" limits his analysis of the connection between speciesism and sexism.

^{*}"Liberation" is the wrong word to use with reference to animals, if only by virtue of the associations that have accrued to it. True liberation movements have always started from among the oppressed and have been fuelled by anger, frustration, and yearning to be free. The Black Liberation and the Women's Liberation movements (as earlier the Abolitionist movement) are properly speaking waves of oppressed people moving to liberate themselves from the oppressor's grip and the internalized perception of the self as victim which keeps the oppressed bound to the oppressor. Liberation is an individual's personal exorcism of the enemy within as well as that individual's battle with the pressures of culture, prejudice, and oppression. Animals have no such battle to fight. All they need is freedom from human control.

Peter Singer and many who have written on behalf of freeing the animals—I think especially of Richard Ryder, Brigid Brophy, and some of the most perceptive contributors to *Animals*, the publication of the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals—are aware of this connection, but leave too much unsaid about the common fate of women and animals in patriarchy. Still, on the speciesist front alone, we face a challenge. As Singer put it, the choice is between tyranny and altruism.

... will we rise to the challenge and prove our capacity for genuine altruism by ending our ruthless exploitation of the species in our power, not because we are forced to do so by rebels or terrorists, but because we recognize that our position is morally indefensible?

The way in which we answer this question depends on the way in which each one of us, individually, answers it.²¹

In addition to Singer's suggestions for action—vegetarianism, careful consumption of manufactured "goods," letter-writing to senators, congressmen, exploitative companies, etc.—I suggest that we ought to aim for a redirection of all the monies lavished on laboratory research into finding ways to decontaminate the earth and its atmosphere from harmful pollutants without using animals. The monies poured into the manufacturing of food additives, cosmetics, plastics, and ever new chemicals, for ever new uses, should be diverted into the banning of all such products. Thrown back on their own resources, the scientists would be forced to think of alternative methods and/or careers.

Ultimately and realistically, the responsibility lies with individuals to seek a wholesome way of life and to liberate ourselves from fears, prejudices, and misconceptions—superstitions all of man's enfeebled civilization, enfeebled imagination and purposeful amnesia. Women especially must do some serious thinking and reconnect, if not to our gynocentric roots, at the very least to the history of man's violence to animals. For what has been done to animals has always preceded what has been done to us.

Notes

¹Aristotle, "Ethica Nicomachea," in Richard McKeon (Ed.), *Introduction to Aristotle* (New York: The Modern Library, Inc., 1947), p. 438.

²quoted in Floyd W. Matson, *The Broken Image: Man, Science and Society* (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1964), p. 64.

³W. Lane-Petter (Ed.), *Animals for Research: Principles of Breeding and Management* (London: Academic Press, 1963), pp. vii-viii.

⁴Vance Packard, *The People Shapers* (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1977), pp. 409-415.

⁵quoted in Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics For Our Treatment of Animals* (New York: Avon Books, 1975), pp. 62-63.

⁶John C. Lilly, *Lilly on Dolphins: Humans of the Sea* (New York: Anchor Books Edition, 1975), p. 28.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁸quoted in R. A. McCance, "Perinatal Physiology," in A. L. Hodgkin, et. al., *The Pursuit of Nature: Informal Essays on the History of Physiology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 134.

⁹Ivan P. Pavlov, *Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex*, trans. and ed. by G.V. Anrep (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1960), p. 411.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 287.

¹¹Renald Melzack and T.H. Scott, "The Effects of Early Experience on the Response to Pain," *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, 1957, 50, p. 158.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 159.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 159.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 160.

¹⁵Joan McIntyre, "Mind in the Waters," in Joan McIntyre (Assembler), *Mind in the Waters* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), p. 222.

¹⁶Andrea Dworkin, *Pornography: Men Possessing Women* (New York: Perigee Books, 1981), p. 74.

¹⁷quoted in Dworkin, *Pornography: Men Possessing Women*, p. 91.

¹⁸Paul D. MacLean, "Man's Reptilian and Limbic Inheritance," in T.J. Boag and D. Campbell, (Eds.), *A True Concept of the Brain and Behavior* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 16.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 18.

²⁰Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, trans. and ed. by James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1961), pp. 38-39.

²¹quoted in José M.R. Delgado, *Physical Control of the Mind: Toward a Psychocivilized Society* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), p. xix.

²²Jean Rostand, *Humanly Possible: A Biologist's Notes on the Future of Mankind*, trans. by Lowell Bair (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1973), p. 153.

²³Delgado, *Physical Control of the Mind*, p. 101.

²⁴Singer, *Animal Liberation*, p. 34.

²⁵quoted in David F. Salisbury, "Animals in the Laboratory: A Necessary Cruelty?" *The Christian Science Monitor*, 9 March 1978, p. 14.

²⁶Lois Kaplan, "Collard Attacks," *The Justice*, 10 March 1981, p. 2.

²⁷D.H. Smyth, *Alternatives to Animal Experiments* (London: Scolar Press, 1978), p. 91.

²⁸Richard D. Ryder, *Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in Research* (London: Davis-Poyner, 1975), p. 17.

²⁹Lane-Petter (Ed.), *Animals for Research: Principles of Breeding and Management*, p. viii.

³⁰Joan McIntyre, "Iceberg," in *Mind in the Waters*, p. 107.

³¹James Tiptree, Jr., "Beaver Tears," in *Out of the Everywhere and Other Extraordinary Visions* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1981), pp. 28-31.

³²Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation*.